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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, public-private partnerships have become an increasingly
popular method to let the private sector provide public infrastructure-based services
in various sectors such as health care, education, and transportation. As has been
pointed out by Hart (2003), a key property of a public-private partnership is the fact
that facility construction and subsequent service provision are bundled and assigned
to a single private-sector entity.1 An often heard argument in favour of public-private
partnerships is that bundling encourages innovative design solutions during the con-
struction phase that may reduce the subsequent costs of service delivery.2 Yet, at
the same time, it has also been argued that compared to traditional procurement,
the long-term relationship inherent in a public-private partnership may create par-
ticular scope for information asymmetries to develop between the public sector and
the private entity. Specifically, the private-sector entity may become better informed
than the public authority about additional costs that may arise in the operation stage
when changes in circumstances occur.3
In this article, we study in an incomplete contracting framework how incentives
to exert innovation eﬀort and incentives to acquire private information aﬀect the
performance of public-private partnerships compared to traditional procurement.
Consider a government agency that wants a certain public good or service to be
provided. Before provision can take place (stage 2), a suitable infrastructure has to
be built (stage 1). For example, in order to provide health care, education, or public
transportation, suitable hospitals, schools, or railroad networks have to be built. Ini-
1See also Grimsey and Lewis (2004, pp. 129, 222), who point out that a defining characteristic of
public-private partnerships is that the tasks of designing and building a facility as well as operating
it later on are integrated within a single private-sector party, whereas under traditional procurement
there are separate contractors for construction and management.
2For example, Yescombe (2007, p. 21) stresses that as the same private-sector entity is responsible
for construction and operation of the facility, it will be prepared to spend more during the construction
phase in order to reduce the costs to be incurred later on. Similarly, the argument that a public-private
partnership encourages the private-sector entity “to plan beyond the bounds of the construction phase
and incorporate features that will facilitate operations” has also been brought forward by Grimsey
and Lewis (2004, p. 92).
3See Yescombe (2007, pp. 24, 273). The fact that in the construction phase, the private-sector
entity in a public-private partnership may gain an informational advantage on the costs of future
investments in service provision has also been pointed out by Chong, Huet, and Saussier (2006),
Chong, Huet, Saussier, and Steiner (2006), and De Palma, Leruth, and Prunier (2009). See also
Monbiot (2002) and Vickerman (2004), who argue that the informational advantage of the private
entity may allow it to exaggerate its costs.
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tially, only the basic features of the good or service can be described in a contract.
But after some time has passed, i.e. when the second stage is reached, it becomes clear
how the basic good or service can be improved by adapting it.4 Hence, at the begin-
ning of the second stage, the government agency can contract for additional features
that increase its benefit but also the costs of provision. For instance, advances in the
field of medical research may require hospitals to introduce new medical treatments
and to meet growing service standards, e.g. to adapt to new medical equipment or to
enlarge the number of operating rooms. Similarly, reforms in the educational system
may necessitate that schools are restructured to turn them into all-day schools. When
a government agency has contracted for the procurement of public transportation, it
may later (e.g., in the light of an increased public interest in safety measures) want
trains to be equipped with passenger information and surveillance technology.
At the outset, the government agency can choose between two diﬀerent modes of
provision. In case of a public-private partnership, building and service provision are
bundled; i.e., the government agency contracts with a single party (a consortium) to
build the infrastructure and to operate it. In contrast, under traditional procurement
the government contracts with one party to build the infrastructure and with another
party to provide the public good or service. All parties are risk-neutral and (except
for the agency) they are protected by limited liability.
In the first stage, the builder provides the basic version of the infrastructure and
he can exert eﬀort to come up with an innovation, which reduces the costs of adapting
the public good or service to future needs.5 Innovation eﬀort is unobservable, but the
government agency obtains a verifiable but noisy signal on the eﬀort level.
When only a standard design was developed in the first stage, the costs of im-
proving the service provision in the second stage by making suitable adaptations are
known to be high. Yet, when the design developed in the first stage is innovative,
4The importance of keeping flexibility to adapt the service provision to new developments that
were not taken into account in the original public-private partnership arrangement has also been
emphasized by Cambridge Economic Policy Associates (2005), HM Treasury (2003), OECD (2008),
Public Accounts Select Committee (2000), and Renda and Schrefler (2006).
5For instance, Grimsey and Lewis (2004, p. 121) report about the Berwick Hospital Project,
in which strong eﬀorts were made to come up with design solutions that retain the flexibility “to
address ongoing changes in medical and health care practices, to accommodate demands for the
future development of new services, and to maximise the opportunities for greater integration of in-
patient care with ambulance and community-based services.” Similarly, structuring school grounds
in innovative ways can aﬀect future eﬀorts that are needed to supervise children during breaks and
in the afternoons. Moreover, carefully designed trains and railway stations may reduce the eﬀorts of
security guards that may be required in the future to meet increasing needs for security.
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then these costs will be lower. In this case, the costs of service improvements are ini-
tially unknown, but the party in charge of construction in the first stage may spend
resources to acquire private information about these costs. However, in the second
stage, while using the infrastructure to provide the public service, the operator learns
the adaptation costs without exerting extra eﬀort.6 Thus, costly information gather-
ing in the first stage is a socially wasteful activity which may be pursued for strategic
reasons only.
In a first-best world in which the eﬀort to come up with an innovation and the in-
formation gathering decision in the first stage were verifiable, the government agency
would be indiﬀerent between the two modes of provision. However, as we assume
that innovation eﬀort is a hidden action and information gathering in the first stage
cannot be ruled out, the two modes of provision diﬀer with regard to their incentive
structure.
Specifically, under traditional procurement the government agency can induce in-
novation eﬀort only by oﬀering a direct reward conditional on the verifiable but noisy
signal, so that the government agency must leave a limited liability rent to the builder.
In contrast, in case of a public-private partnership incentives to innovate can arise
indirectly when the consortium anticipates that it may enjoy a second-stage informa-
tion rent if in the first stage it develops an innovation and gathers information. As a
consequence, for the government agency a public-private partnership has the advan-
tage that the indirect incentives reduce the limited liability rent which is necessary to
induce innovation eﬀort. Yet, the disadvantage of a public-private partnership is that
the consortium may gather socially wasteful information which makes it more costly
for the government agency to implement the second-stage service improvements.
As a result of this trade-oﬀ, it turns out that the government agency prefers
a public-private partnership when the quality of the eﬀort signal is low, such that
under traditional procurement a large limited liability rent would have to be paid.
In contrast, when the eﬀort signal is very precise, the agency prefers traditional
procurement. Moreover, when the information gathering costs are relatively small,
a public-private partnership is the government agency’s preferred mode of provision,
because in this case the indirect eﬀort incentives due to the expected information rent
6Note that it is natural to assume that once an operator provides the public service and thus
uses the infrastructure, he is in a better position to obtain information about the costs of improving
the service provision. The assumption that relevant information becomes costlessly available to an
agent after a contract is signed is common in the literature on endogenous information structures,
see e.g. Crémer and Khalil (1992; 1994) and Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a).
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in case of an innovation are strong. Furthermore, we allow the government agency
to put some positive weight on the profits that accrue to the private contractors.
An increase in this weight makes traditional procurement more attractive for the
government agency, because then it suﬀers less from leaving a limited liability rent
to a private contractor and it wants to avoid the welfare loss due to socially wasteful
information gathering.
To present our central trade-oﬀ in its purest form, in the main part of the article
we assume that the government agency can observe whether or not information is
gathered at the end of the first stage. We show in an extension that our results are
qualitatively robust when information gathering is unobservable, even though then in
case of a public-private partnership the equilibrium may be in mixed strategies such
that ex post ineﬃciencies may occur.
There is by now a vast literature on the role of private firms in the provision of
public goods.7 Specifically, the theoretical literature on public-private partnerships
has various strands. As pointed out above, we follow Hart (2003) who argues that a
key property of a public-private partnership is the fact that building the infrastruc-
ture and service provision are bundled. Whereas Hart (2003) considers a model with
symmetric information, our aim is to highlight the implications of the possibility to
gather private information; hence, we study a framework in which under symmetric
information the mode of provision would be irrelevant. In order to focus on the key
question whether or not the two stages should be separated, we follow Hart (2003)
in that we do not complicate the analysis by introducing the choice between pub-
lic and private ownership.8 The interaction of the mode of provision and diﬀerent
ownership structures under symmetric information has been studied by Bennett and
Iossa (2006a,b) and Chen and Chiu (2010). A common feature of their models and our
framework is that second-stage service improvements are non-contractible ex ante but
become verifiable ex post. In contrast, Bentz, Grout, and Halonen (2004) study re-
7For surveys on privatization, see e.g. Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Bös (1991), Shleifer (1998), and
Martimort (2006). In this literature, the focus is generally on informational asymmetries and/or con-
tractual incompleteness (e.g., Shapiro and Willig, 1990, Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991, Schmidt, 1996a,b).
8The eﬀects of public and private ownership on investment incentives are studied by Hart, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997), who build on the property rights approach based on incomplete contracting
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). Hoppe and Schmitz (2010a) extend
their model by considering a richer set of contractual arrangements. See also Besley and Ghatak
(2001), Francesconi and Muthoo (2006), and Halonen-Akatwijuka and Pafilis (2009) who build on
the property rights approach to analyze whether non-governmental organizations should own public
goods.
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lated questions in a complete contracting framework. Martimort and Pouyet (2008)
develop a model that encompasses both traditional agency problems and property
rights and they find that the important issue is not who owns the assets, but instead
whether tasks are bundled or not. Iossa and Martimort (2008, 2009) provide exten-
sions and applications of this framework, highlighting the positive (resp., negative)
eﬀects of bundling in the presence of positive (resp., negative) externalities between
the stages.9 In more recent contributions to the literature on public-private partner-
ships, Iossa and Martimort (forthcoming) and Martimort and Straub (2012) analyze
the costs and benefits of bundling the building and the operating stage when a pro-
ductivity shock occurs between the two stages. To the best of our knowledge, our
article is the first one which introduces information gathering into a public-private
partnership context.10
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, the
model is introduced. The two diﬀerent modes of provision are studied in Section
3 (traditional procurement) and Section 4 (public-private partnership). In Section
5, we analyze which mode of provision is preferred by the government agency. In
Section 6, we explore the robustness of our results with regard to the unobservability
of information gathering. Concluding remarks follow in Section 7. All proofs have
been relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
The principal (a government agency) wants to delegate the provision of a public good
or service. There are two stages. In the first stage, a suitable infrastructure has to
be designed and built (task 1), whereas in the second stage it has to be managed
and operated (task 2). At the outset, the principal can choose between two diﬀerent
modes of provision. Either the principal opts for a public-private partnership, i.e.
she contracts with one agent (a consortium) in charge of both tasks, or she contracts
9On the pros and cons of bundling sequential tasks when complete contracts can be written, see
also Schmitz (2005) and the literature discussed there.
10 In our model, information gathering is a strategic rent-seeking activity which has no productive
value. The same assumption has first been made in otherwise standard adverse selection models
by Crémer and Khalil (1992, 1994). Further contributions in which information gathering is so-
cially wasteful include Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a), Schmitz (2006), and Hoppe and Schmitz
(2010b), whereas productive information gathering has been studied by Aghion and Tirole (1997),
Lewis and Sappington (1997), Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998b), Kessler (1998), and Khalil, Kim,
and Shin (2006).
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with two diﬀerent agents each in charge of one task (traditional procurement). The
agents are protected by limited liability, their reservation utilities are zero, and all
parties are risk-neutral.
The agent in charge of task 1 can build a basic version of the infrastructure, causing
monetary and verifiable costs 1. Additionally, to come up with an innovation, the
agent can exert eﬀort  ∈ {0 1} at non-monetary eﬀort costs , where   0.
We assume throughout that the eﬀort level  is unobservable. Yet, the principal
obtains a verifiable but noisy signal  ∈ {0 1} on the agent’s eﬀort level. Specifically,
Pr{ = 1| = 1} = Pr{ = 0| = 0} = , where  ∈ (12 1] denotes the precision
of the signal. The agent’s eﬀort leads to a success ( = 1) with probability  and
to a failure ( = 0) otherwise, where the outcome  is observable but not verifiable,
and  ∈ (0 1). A success means that an innovation has been developed that reduces
the costs of undertaking adaptations (not yet describable in stage 1) to improve the
service provision in the second stage.11
Specifically, in the second stage the agent in charge of task 2 can provide a stan-
dard version of the public good or service, which entails monetary and verifiable costs
2 and yields a benefit  to the principal. We assume that   1 +2, so that at
least it is always desirable to build the basic infrastructure and to provide the stan-
dard service. Moreover, in stage 2 it is possible to contract upon improvements of the
service provision which yield an additional benefit  to the principal. Let  ∈ {0 1}
denote whether or not the adaptations are implemented. The non-monetary eﬀort
costs of improving the second-stage service provision are denoted by . If there was
no innovation ( = 0), then  = , whereas  ∈ { } with Pr{ = } =  if
an innovation was made ( = 1), where 0      . Hence, if an innovation
was made, the expected adaptation costs are [] =  + (1 − ). To rule out
trivial cases in which implementing the adaptations is never desirable, we assume
that  ≥ .
If an innovation was made, initially no one knows the realization of the adaptation
costs  ∈ { }. However, at the end of stage 1, the agent in charge of task 1 can
exert eﬀort in order to gather information about the costs . In particular, if the agent
incurs non-monetary eﬀort costs   0, then he learns the realization of , whereas
he remains uninformed otherwise. The agent in charge of the second stage uses the
infrastructure to provide the service and thereby he costlessly learns the adaptation
costs  before the adaptations may take place. In line with the work of Crémer
11Our assumption that an innovation is observable ex post but cannot be contracted upon ex ante
is in line with Aghion and Tirole’s (1994a, 1994b) work on the management of innovation.
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and Khalil (1992; 1994) and Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a), costly information
gathering in the first stage is thus “premature,” it is an unproductive rent seeking
activity which may be performed for strategic reasons only.
Throughout, an agent’s utility is given by the payment he gets from the principal
minus his costs. Following Baron and Myerson (1982), we assume that the principal
may put some weight on the utility that accrues to the agent(s). Let this weight be
given by  ∈ [0 1). Hence, if  = 0, the principal is interested only in her benefit
 +  net of her payment to the agent(s). If  goes to one, the principal’s objective
function approaches that of a welfare maximizer.
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Figure 1. The sequence of events.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1. At date 0, the principal chooses
the mode of provision (traditional procurement or a public-private partnership). The
principal always oﬀers to cover the verifiable costs 1 and 2. Moreover, at date 0
she can contractually commit to pay the agent who is in charge of the first task a
reward whenever the verifiable eﬀort signal will be favorable ( = 1).12 At date 1,
the agent in charge of the first task builds the basic version of the infrastructure and
decides how much eﬀort  to exert to come up with an innovation. At date 1.5, the
verifiable signal  is realized, and at date 2, the parties observe whether or not an
innovative infrastructure has been developed. In case of an innovation, at date 2.5
the agent who has built the infrastructure can (prematurely) learn the costs of future
adaptations if he incurs information gathering costs . In line with Kessler (1998),
in the main part of the article we assume that the principal can observe whether or
not the agent has gathered information.13
12Note that as the agent is protected by limited liability, payments to the agent cannot be negative.
Hence, it is not possible to implement a penalty in case of an unfavorable signal.
13This assumption simplifies the exposition and thus allows us to present our main trade-oﬀ in its
purest form. We analyze the case of unobservable information gathering in Section 6.
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At date 3, the adaptations necessary to improve the second-stage service provision
become contractible. The principal can then oﬀer the agent in charge of the second
task a payment for the implementation of the adaptations. In case of an innovation,
at date 3.5 the agent costlessly learns the adaptation costs  ∈ { } (he learns
nothing new when he has already gathered information at date 2.5). Finally, at date
4 the adaptations may take place and the agent provides the public good or service.
Note that in our model the only diﬀerence between the two modes of provision
is the fact that in case of a public-private partnership, the same agent is in charge
of both tasks, whereas in case of traditional procurement, two diﬀerent agents are in
charge of the two tasks. Thus, in a first-best world the mode of provision would be
irrelevant.
The first-best benchmark. Note that costly information gathering at date 2.5 is
socially wasteful, because the same information will become costlessly available at
date 3.5, before the adaptations may take place. Hence, in a first-best world, the
information gathering costs  would never be incurred. Moreover, in a first-best
world the adaptations would be implemented (() = 1) whenever  ≥ . Thus,
the first-best eﬀort level is  = 1 if and only if
[(− ) + (1− )max{−  0}] + (1− )max{−  0}−  ≥ max{−  0}
This implies that if  ≥ , then  = 1 whenever  ≤ (min{ } − []).
Moreover, if   , then  = 1 whenever  ≤ (− ).
Regardless of the mode of provision, the principal would implement the first-best
outcome if the eﬀort level  and the information gathering decision were verifiable.
However, in the remainder of the article we assume that innovation eﬀort  is a hidden
action and premature information acquisition is not contractible. Thus, when we find
that one of the two modes of provision is strictly preferred, then this must be due to
incentive considerations only.
3 Traditional procurement
We first consider traditional procurement. In the second stage, the principal hires
agent 2 (the operator) to use the infrastructure in order to provide a public good or
service. The principal oﬀers the agent to take over the verifiable costs 2. Moreover,
at the beginning of the second stage the adaptations that can improve the service
provision become contractible. Therefore, at date 3 the principal considers to oﬀer
one of the following three contractual arrangements to the agent.
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A: The agent has the option to decide at date 4 whether or not to implement the
adaptations; i.e., he is free to choose  ∈ {0 1}. As a compensation, the agent will
get the payment .
A: The agent has to implement the adaptations (i.e., he must choose  = 1) at date
4. As a compensation, he gets the payment .
A[]: The agent has to implement the adaptations (i.e., he must choose  = 1) at
date 4. As a compensation, he gets the payment [].
Suppose first that there was no success at date 2 ( = 0), so that the eﬀort costs
of implementing the second-stage service improvements are  = . If the principal’s
benefit from the adaptations outweighs their costs ( ≥ ), then at date 3 the
principal oﬀers contract A to the agent (which will be accepted by the agent, as his
costs are reimbursed).14 Otherwise, the principal will not ask the agent to implement
the adaptations.
Next, suppose that there was an innovation ( = 1), so that at the beginning of
the second stage the principal and the operator are uninformed about whether the
adaptation costs are  or . If implementing the adaptations is ex post eﬃcient
regardless of the state of nature ( ≥ ), then at date 3 the principal oﬀers contract
A[], which the agent will accept because his expected costs are reimbursed. If
implementing the adaptations is desirable in the good state of nature only ( ≤
  ), then at date 3 the principal oﬀers contract A. The agent will accept the
contract and after he has learnt the realization of  at date 3.5, he will implement the
adaptations whenever  = .
Note that in each case the first-best adaptation decision () is implemented,
and the agent gets no rent. Therefore, at date 3 the principal cannot attain a larger
expected payoﬀ. We can thus state the following result.
Lemma 1 Consider traditional procurement. At date 3, the principal’s continuation
payoﬀ is  − 2 +max{−  0} if  = 0,  − 2 +  − [] if  = 1 and  ≥ ,
and  − 2 + (− ) if  = 1 and   .
Now consider the first stage. The principal hires agent 1 (the builder) to design
and build the infrastructure. She oﬀers the agent to bear the verifiable costs 1. Un-
der traditional procurement, agent 1 knows that he will not be in charge of the second
stage. Hence, as the information will not be relevant for him, he does not engage in
14 It is straightforward to check that contract A could be equivalently replaced by a contract in
which the agent can choose  ∈ {0 1} at date 4 and he gets the payment .
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costly information gathering at date 2.5. The only possibility for the principal to
induce the agent to exert innovation eﬀort at date 1 is to oﬀer him a contract at date
0 which promises the agent a reward conditional on the verifiable signal . Let  ≥ 0
denote the payment that the principal commits to make to the agent whenever the
signal is favorable ( = 1).15
When the agent exerts high eﬀort ( = 1), he will get the reward  with probability
  12, whereas he will get the reward only with probability 1−  when he shirks.
Hence, the agent exerts high eﬀort whenever the incentive compatibility constraint
 −  ≥ (1− )
is satisfied. Therefore, if the principal wants to induce high eﬀort, she sets  =
(2− 1),16 so that the agent’s limited liability rent is (2− 1)−. Note that
the more precise the signal is, the smaller is the rent that the principal must leave to
the agent. Whether or not the principal actually wants to induce high eﬀort depends
on the eﬀort costs  as well as on the precision  of the signal. In particular, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider traditional procurement.
(i) Suppose that  ≥ . The principal induces high eﬀort whenever
 ≤  ( ) := (min{ }−[]) 2 − 1 − (1− ) 
(ii) Suppose that   . The principal induces high eﬀort whenever
 ≤ ˜ ( ) := (− ) 2 − 1 − (1− ) 
Proof. See the appendix.
If the eﬀort costs  are suﬃciently small, the principal implements high eﬀort.
Yet, as the principal can induce high eﬀort only by leaving a limited liability rent
to the agent, high eﬀort is not always implemented when it would be chosen in the
first-best benchmark.
Observe that the threshold functions  ( ) and ˜ ( ) are increasing in
the precision  of the signal and in the weight  that the principal puts on the agents’
15 It is straightforward to show that it is never optimal to reward the agent if the signal is unfavorable
( = 0). For an excellent textbook exposition of the standard moral hazard model with limited
liability, see Laﬀont and Martimort (2002).
16Note that the principal always wants to make transfer payments to the agents as small as possible,
because a payment   0 to an agent reduces the principal’s payoﬀ by (1− )  0.
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utility. In particular, if  goes to one, then the principal’s decision to implement
high eﬀort approaches the first-best benchmark, because in this case the rent that
is necessary to induce high eﬀort becomes zero. The first-best benchmark is also
approached if  goes to one, because then in the limit the principal becomes a welfare
maximizer who does not find it costly to leave a rent to the agent.
4 Public-private partnership
Now let us consider a public-private partnership, so that the same agent is in charge
of both stages. The principal oﬀers the agent to take over the verifiable costs 1
in the first stage and 2 in the second stage. Suppose that there was no success
at date 2 ( = 0), so that the eﬀort costs of implementing the second-stage service
improvements are . Note that then there is no scope for information gathering at
date 2.5. At date 3, the principal will implement the adaptations (by oﬀering contract
A) whenever  ≥ . Next, suppose there was an innovation ( = 1), but the agent
has not gathered information at date 2.5. Then, in analogy to the case of traditional
procurement, the principal will oﬀer the contract A[] if  ≥ , and she oﬀers the
contract A otherwise. Therefore, the following result holds.
Lemma 2 Consider a public-private partnership. If there was no innovation in the
first stage or if there was an innovation but the agent has not gathered information
at date 2.5, then the principal’s continuation payoﬀ at date 3 is as in the case of
traditional procurement (see Lemma 1) and the agent’s continuation payoﬀ is zero.
Now suppose that at date 2 an innovation was made ( = 1) and the agent has
gathered information at date 2.5. Note that if the agent has learnt that his costs are
, then at date 3 he will agree to implement the adaptations whenever the principal
oﬀers at least the payment . Similarly, if the agent has learnt that his costs are
, then at date 3 he will agree to implement the adaptations whenever he is oﬀered
at least . Thus, at date 3 the principal oﬀers either contract A or contract A,
which is defined as follows.17
A: The agent has to implement the adaptations (i.e., he must choose  = 1) at date
4. As a compensation, he gets the payment .
17 If the agent is informed, contract A could be equivalently replaced by a contract according to
which the agent must choose  = 1 (as he learns nothing new after accepting the contract). Similarly,
contract A could be equivalently replaced by a contract in which the agent chooses  ∈ {0 1} at
date 4 and the agent gets the payment .
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If the principal oﬀers contract A, the adaptations will be implemented regardless
of the realization of , and the agent enjoys an information rent  −  in the good
state of nature. At date 3, the principal’s expected payoﬀ then is  −2 + −  +
( − ). If the principal oﬀers contract A, the adaptations are implemented in
the good state of nature only and the agent gets no rent. At date 3, the principal’s
expected payoﬀ then is  − 2 + ( − ). A comparison of the expected payoﬀs
immediately yields the following result.
Lemma 3 Consider a public-private partnership. Suppose that there was an innova-
tion and the agent has gathered information at date 2.5. Define
ˆ() := (1− ) − 
1−  + .
(i) If  ≥ ˆ(), then at date 3 the principal oﬀers contract A, so that her expected
continuation payoﬀ is −2+−+(−) and at date 2.5 the agent’s expected
information rent is ( − )− .
(ii) If   ˆ(), then at date 3 the principal oﬀers contract A, so that her expected
continuation payoﬀ is  −2 + (− ) and the agent gets no rent.
If the benefit from implementing the adaptations is suﬃciently large ( ≥ ˆ()),
the principal always wants the adaptations to be undertaken. In contrast, if  is
suﬃciently small, the principal prefers not to implement the adaptations in the bad
state in order to extract a larger part of the benefit in the good state. Note that the
critical value ˆ() is larger than . Hence, if the agent gathered information in the
case     ˆ(), the adaptation decision would be ex post ineﬃcient in the bad
state of nature. Otherwise, ex post eﬃciency ( = ()) is achieved.
Now consider the first stage. Recall that costly information gathering at date 2.5
is socially wasteful, because the information will be costlessly available at date 3.5.
Yet, the agent may nevertheless engage in premature information gathering in order
to gain a strategic advantage. Specifically, the agent gathers information at date 2.5
whenever an informed agent gets an information rent in the second stage, provided
that the information acquisition costs are suﬃciently small.
Lemma 4 Consider a public-private partnership and suppose that there was an in-
novation. The agent will gather information at date 2.5 whenever (i) an informed
agent gets an information rent in the second stage (i.e.,  ≥ ˆ()) and (ii) the infor-
mation gathering costs are smaller than the expected second-stage information rent,
 ≤ ( − ).
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As in a public-private partnership the same agent is in charge of both stages, the
agent can be motivated to exert innovation eﬀort in the first stage for two diﬀerent
reasons. First, the principal can directly incentivize the agent by oﬀering to pay him
a reward  ≥ 0 in case of a favorable signal ( = 1). Second, investment incentives
can arise indirectly when the agent anticipates that he may enjoy a second-stage
information rent if he comes up with an innovation in the first stage.
Note that if information gathering is prohibitively costly (  ( − )) or if
adaptations are not suﬃciently important (  ˆ()), then according to Lemma 4 the
agent will never gather information at date 2.5. In this case, we know from Lemma
2 that the principal’s expected date-3 payoﬀs do not diﬀer between a public-private
partnership and traditional procurement. Moreover, the agent never gets a second-
stage rent, so that the agent can only be motivated to exert first-stage eﬀort through
a direct reward , just as in the case of traditional procurement. Hence, in case of a
public-private partnership the principal would implement the same first-stage eﬀort
levels as under traditional procurement (see Proposition 1). As a result, at date 0
the principal would be indiﬀerent between the two modes of provision.
Remark 1 Consider a public-private partnership. If   ( − ) or   ˆ(),
then there is no information gathering at date 2.5 and the principal induces the same
eﬀort levels as in case of traditional procurement, so that she is indiﬀerent between
the two modes of provision.
In what follows, we consider the interesting case in which information gathering
at date 2.5 is not prohibitively costly and in which the adaptations are suﬃciently
important; i.e., we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (i)  ≤ ( − ).
(ii)  ≥ ˆ().
At date 1, the agent knows that he will get the direct reward  with probability
 if he exerts high eﬀort ( = 1); otherwise he will get the reward  with probability
1−  only. Moreover, he knows that in case of an innovation ( = 1), he will gather
information (which entails information gathering costs ) and his expected second-
stage information rent is ( − ). At date 1, the agent thus exerts high eﬀort
whenever the incentive compatibility constraint
 + [( − )− ]−  ≥ (1− )
is satisfied.
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Hence, there are two cases. If  ≤ [( − ) − ], then the prospect to earn
the second-stage information rent is so attractive for the agent that he exerts high
eﬀort even in the absence of direct incentives; i.e., the principal will set  = 0.
In contrast, if   [(− )− ], then the indirect incentives alone are not strong
enough to motivate the agent to exert high eﬀort. In this case, if the principal wants
to implement high eﬀort, she will set  = ( − [( − )− ])(2 − 1). We
thus obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 Consider a public-private partnership and let Assumption 1 be satis-
fied.
(i) If  ≤ [( − )− ], the agent always exerts high eﬀort.
(ii) If   [( − )− ], the principal implements high eﬀort whenever
 ≤  (  ) := (min{ }− ) 2 − 1 − (1− ) + [( − )− ]
Proof. See the appendix.
Observe that in case (i) the first-best eﬀort level is implemented. However, when
the second-stage information rent is not large enough to let the agent choose high
eﬀort without a direct reward (case ii), then the principal may prefer to implement
low eﬀort, even when in the first-best benchmark high eﬀort would be chosen. The
threshold function  (  ) is increasing in  and . Yet, in contrast to the
case of traditional procurement, even if  or  go to one, the principal’s decision rule
to implement high eﬀort does not converge to the first-best benchmark. If  goes to
one, the first-stage limited liability rent goes to zero, but as the principal must leave
a second-stage information rent to the agent, her gain from an innovation is reduced.
If  goes to one, the principal’s behavior approaches that of a welfare maximizer, so
that in the limit payments to the agent are not costly to her. Yet, her gain from
an innovation is still smaller than in the first-best benchmark, because an innovation
triggers socially wasteful information gathering.18
Finally, observe that the threshold function  (  ) is decreasing in . If
information gathering becomes more costly, the agent’s indirect incentives due to the
second-stage information rent decrease, so that inducing high eﬀort requires a larger
direct reward  and thus becomes less attractive for the principal.
18Note that we have assumed that   1, so that at date 3 the principal strictly prefers to oﬀer
contract A[] to an uninformed agent. If  was equal to one, transfer payments to the agent would
not be costly for the principal. Hence, in the second stage she would be willing to make a transfer
payment  ≥  regardless of whether or not the agent has gathered information, so that the first-best
outcome would trivially be achieved.
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5 Public-private partnership versus traditional procure-
ment
We can now analyze the principal’s date-0 decision regarding the mode of provision.
As first-stage eﬀort is unobservable, under traditional procurement the principal can
induce high eﬀort only by paying a direct reward conditional on the verifiable signal.
As the signal is noisy, this means that the agent must get a limited liability rent in
the first stage, which is costly for the principal. In contrast, in a public-private part-
nership the agent has an indirect incentive to exert eﬀort in the first stage because he
anticipates that in case of a success he will obtain an information rent in the second
stage. Hence, on the one hand, a public-private partnership has the advantage that
first-stage eﬀort is less costly to induce, but on the other hand it has the disadvan-
tage that implementing the second-stage adaptations is more costly for the principal
because the agent has an incentive to prematurely gather private information. This
trade-oﬀ is reflected by the following result.
Proposition 3 Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. At date 0, the principal chooses be-
tween the two modes of provision as follows.
(i) Suppose that  ≤ [( − )− ]. Define
¯(  ) := [(1− )( −[]) + ] 2 − 1(1− ) 
The principal prefers a public-private partnership if   ¯(  ), whereas she
prefers traditional procurement if   ¯(  ).
(ii) Suppose that   [( − )− ]. Define
¯( ) := (1− )( − ) + 
(1− )( − ) + (1 + ) 
The principal prefers a public-private partnership if    (  ) and  
¯( ). The principal prefers traditional procurement if    ( ) and  
¯( ), and she is indiﬀerent between the two modes of provision otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix.
In part (i) of Proposition 3, the first-stage eﬀort costs  are relatively small, so
that in case of a public-private partnership the agent exerts high eﬀort just because
of the prospect to earn a second-stage information rent, even in the absence of a
direct reward in the first stage (cf. Proposition 2). The principal then prefers a
public-private partnership, except when the eﬀort costs are so small that the first-
stage limited liability rent that is necessary to induce eﬀort in case of traditional
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procurement becomes less costly for the principal than the second-stage information
rent that she must leave to the agent in case of a public-private partnership.
In part (ii) of Proposition 3, the first-stage eﬀort costs are larger, so that also
in case of a public-private partnership the principal must pay a direct reward to the
agent in order to induce high eﬀort (although the reward can be smaller than the
one that is necessary in case of traditional procurement). As long as the first-stage
eﬀort costs are small enough so that the principal induces high eﬀort, she prefers
a public-private partnership when the precision  of the signal is suﬃciently small,
whereas she prefers traditional procurement if the precision is large. The reason for
this finding is the fact that the limited liability rent that the principal must pay to
the agent in the first stage under traditional procurement is large when the quality of
the signal is poor, so that in this case a public-private partnership is more attractive.
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Figure 2. The principal’s choice between traditional procurement and a public-
private partnership. Note that high eﬀort is first-best ( = 1) whenever
 ≤ (min{ }−[]).
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 2. Note that in the case  ≤ [( −
) − ], the principal prefers a public-private partnership (so that the agent always
chooses high eﬀort) whenever  ≥ ¯(  ), and she prefers traditional procurement
(inducing high eﬀort) otherwise. Observe that the threshold function ¯( ) is
increasing in . Intuitively, when  becomes larger, the first-stage limited liability rent
that the principal must pay under traditional procurement becomes smaller, which
17
makes traditional procurement more attractive. Moreover, it is straightforward to
show that the threshold function ¯(  ) is also increasing in . Hence, the more
weight the principal puts on the agent’s utility, the larger the region in which she
prefers traditional procurement. When  increases, the principal cares less about the
limited liability rent, but she cares more about the fact that in case of a public-private
partnership the information gathering costs are socially wasteful, so that she finds a
public-private partnership less desirable. Furthermore, note that if   0, then the
threshold function ¯(  ) is increasing in . The reason is that an increase in 
reduces the agent’s payoﬀ in case of a public-private partnership, so that traditional
procurement becomes relatively more attractive for the principal, provided she puts
a positive weight on the agent’s utility.
In the case   [( − ) − ], Figure 1 illustrates that the principal prefers
a public-private partnership whenever  ≤ ¯( ) and traditional procurement oth-
erwise, provided that the eﬀort costs  are suﬃciently small so that high eﬀort is
induced (which is the case for  ≤  (  ) in case of a public-private partner-
ship and for  ≤  ( ) in case of traditional procurement). Note that the cut-oﬀ
value ¯( ) is decreasing in , which again shows that the region in which the prin-
cipal prefers traditional procurement becomes larger when her behavior approaches
that of a welfare maximizer. Moreover, the cut-oﬀ value is decreasing in . In case
of a public-private partnership, if information gathering becomes more costly, then
the agent is worse oﬀ and the principal must pay a larger direct reward in the first
stage to induce high eﬀort. As a consequence, traditional procurement then becomes
relatively more attractive for the principal.
The comparative statics findings are summarized in the following result.
Corollary 1 Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. At date 0, the principal’s choice between
the two modes of provision depends on the precision  of the eﬀort signal, the infor-
mation gathering costs , and on the weight  that the principal puts on the agent’s
utility as follows. An increase of , , or  makes traditional procurement relatively
more attractive, whereas a public-private partnership becomes more attractive when
, , or  decrease.
6 Unobservable information gathering
So far, we have assumed that the agent’s decision to gather information at date 2.5
is observable by the principal. We now analyze a variant of the model in which
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information gathering is a hidden action. Note that the analysis does not change in
the case of traditional procurement.
Now consider the case of a public-private partnership. The analysis of the second
stage remains unchanged if there was no innovation, because then there is no scope
for information gathering. Thus, suppose that there was an innovation ( = 1) and
the agent has gathered information with probability  ∈ [0 1]. It is straightforward
to see that at date 3 it is then optimal for the principal to oﬀer contract A, A[], or
A.19 If the adaptations are suﬃciently important and information gathering is not
prohibitively costly, the agent will now gather information with a probability strictly
between zero and one.
Lemma 5 Consider a public-private partnership. Suppose that there was an innova-
tion and the agent’s information gathering decision is unobservable. If  ≤  or if
 ≥ (1−)(−), then the agent never gathers information. Otherwise, the agent
gathers information with probability  ∈ (0 1).
Proof. See the appendix.
If  ≤ , then the principal oﬀers contract A, such that the agent never gathers
information. Now suppose that   . Intuitively, if the agent always gathered
information, the principal would oﬀer either contract A (leaving no rent to the agent)
or contract A (which the agent would accept regardless of the state of nature), so
that the agent would have no incentive to gather costly information. Hence, the
agent gathers information with a probability strictly smaller than one. If the agent
never gathered information, the principal would oﬀer contract A[], so that the agent
would prefer to gather information (and then accept the oﬀer in the good state of
nature only), provided that the information gathering costs are suﬃciently small.
If there is no information gathering at date 2.5, then the principal is indiﬀerent
between a public-private partnership and traditional procurement. Hence, in the
remainder of this section we assume that    and   (1− )( − ), so that
the agent gathers information with probability  ∈ (0 1).
19Suppose the principal wants the adaptations to be implemented only if the agent knows (or learns
at date 3.5) that  = . Then contract A makes the smallest possible transfer payment to the agent.
If in addition the principal wants uninformed agents who at date 3.5 will learn  =  to implement
the adaptations, contract A[] makes the smallest possible transfer payment. Finally, contract A
makes the smallest possible transfer payment if the principal wants the adaptations always to be
implemented.
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Lemma 6 Consider a public-private partnership. Suppose that there was an inno-
vation, the agent’s information gathering decision is unobservable, and   (1 −
)( − ).
(i) If     ˆ(), then at date 2.5 the agent gathers information with probability
 = −−[]−(−[]) . At date 3, the principal oﬀers contract A[] with probability
 = ([]−) and contract A with probability 1−. At date 3, the principal’s expected
continuation payoﬀ is −2+ (− ), and at date 2.5 the agent’s expected rent is
zero.
(ii) If  ≥ ˆ(), then at date 2.5 the agent gathers information with probability
 = (1−)(−[])(1−)(−[])−([]−) . The principal oﬀers contract A[] with probability  =

([]−) and contract A with probability 1− . At date 3, the principal’s expected
continuation payoﬀ is  − 2 +  −  + ( − ), and at date 2.5 the agent’s
expected rent is ( − )− 1− .
Proof. See the appendix.
Recall that in the setting in which information gathering was observable, in equi-
librium the adaptation decisions were always ex post eﬃcient. This is no longer the
case when information gathering is unobservable, so that the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies.
First, consider case (i), where  is relatively small. When an innovation was made,
at date 3 the principal mixes between the contracts A and A[]. Thus, there is an
ex post ineﬃciency if the agent has already learnt at date 2.5 that  =  or if the
principal oﬀers contract A to an uninformed agent who learns at date 4 that  = .
Even though the agent gathers information with positive probability (which in the
case   ˆ() he would not do if information gathering was observable), at date 2.5 his
expected rent is zero (just as in the observable information setting). To see this, recall
that the agent must be indiﬀerent between gathering and not gathering information. If
the agent does not gather information, his expected rent is zero, regardless of whether
he is oﬀered contract A or A[]. Moreover, the principal’s expected second-stage
payoﬀ in case of an innovation now is  − 2 + ( − ), which is less than the
expected second-stage payoﬀ  − 2 +  − [] that the principal would get in the
setting with observable information gathering (where the agent is always uninformed
when   ˆ()). As a consequence, whereas for   ˆ() the principal was always
indiﬀerent between traditional procurement and a public-private partnership in the
setting with observable information gathering, she now strictly prefers traditional
procurement, provided that (at least under traditional procurement) she wants to
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implement high eﬀort.
Next, consider case (ii), where  is relatively large. After an innovation was
made, the principal mixes between the contracts A and A[]. Hence, an ex post
ineﬃciency occurs when contract A[] is oﬀered and the agent has already learnt at
date 2.5 that  = . Observe also that the principal must be indiﬀerent between the
contracts A and A[], and an oﬀer A is always accepted such that the principal’s
expected second-stage payoﬀ is −2+ − +(−), which is the same as in
the setting with observable information gathering when  ≥ ˆ(). Yet, at date 2.5 the
expected rent of the agent is now only (− )− 1− , whereas it was (− )−
when information gathering was observable. Therefore, given information gathering
costs , the principal now prefers a public-private partnership whenever in the setting
with observable information gathering she preferred a public-private partnership given
information gathering costs 1− . In other words, regarding the choice between the two
modes of provision, making information gathering unobservable has the same eﬀect
as an increase of  in the setting with observable information gathering; i.e., the set
of parameters for which a public-private partnership is preferred becomes smaller.
Specifically, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the agent’s information gathering decision is unobserv-
able and   (1− )( − ).
(i) Suppose that     ˆ(). If    (), then the principal prefers
traditional procurement. Otherwise, she is indiﬀerent between traditional procurement
and a public-private partnership.
(ii) Suppose that  ≥ ˆ(). In the case  ≤ [( − ) − 1− ], the principal
prefers a public-private partnership if   ¯(  1−), whereas she prefers traditional
procurement if   ¯(  1−). In the case   [( − ) − 1− ], the principal
prefers a public private partnership if    (  1−) and   ¯( 1−), she
prefers traditional procurement if    () and   ¯( 1−), and she is
indiﬀerent between the two modes of provision otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix.
Overall, the unobservability of information gathering makes traditional procure-
ment relatively more attractive for the principal. Specifically, if   ˆ(), then there
are parameter constellations for which the principal strictly prefers traditional pro-
curement when information gathering is unobservable, whereas she would be indiﬀer-
ent between the modes of provision if it was observable. If  ≥ ˆ(), then the analysis
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of Section 5 does not change qualitatively (see Figure 3). In particular, Corollary 1
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Figure 3. The principal’s choice between traditional procurement and a public-private part-
nership when information gathering is unobservable and  ≥ ˆ() (solid curves). For compar-
ison, the dashed curves refer to the case of observable information gathering (cf. Figure 2).
7 Concluding remarks
When it comes to public-private partnerships, it “all revolves around incentives. In
a world of ‘incomplete’ contracts, where it is diﬃcult to foresee and contract about
uncertain future events, it is important to get the incentive structure right” (Grimsey
and Lewis, 2004, p. 247). It has often been argued that the delegation of the tasks
of building, maintaining, and managing a facility to a single private contractor is
the central characteristic of a public-private partnership. In an incomplete contract-
ing framework, bundling the tasks may provide the private contractor with strong
incentives to develop a flexible design that will be particularly cost-eﬀective in the
operation stage and that can respond eﬃciently to changing requirements and new
technologies in the future. However, as has been emphasized by Prendergast (1999),
the provision of incentives can often give rise to dysfunctional responses. Indeed, in
the case of a public-private partnership the private contractor enters into a long-term
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relationship with the public sector, which may create scope for the private party
to engage in rent-seeking behavior. Specifically, to the best of our knowledge, the
present article is the first one that formally models the private contractor’s incentives
to spend resources during the construction phase in order to obtain private informa-
tion, so that he will be able to extract an information rent in the management stage.
Whether a public-private partnership or traditional procurement is more attractive
for the government agency then depends on the information gathering costs, the eﬀort
costs, and on the degree to which eﬀort is contractible.
To highlight the eﬀects that bundling diﬀerent tasks in a public-private partner-
ship has on the incentives to innovate and to gather information, we have confined our
attention to a very stylized model. Hence, although beyond the scope of the present
article, it might be worthwhile to extend our framework to incorporate further aspects
that are also relevant when a decision between a public-private partnership and tra-
ditional procurement has to be made. For example, modelling the award procedure,
explicitly taking into account contracting costs, or investigating the eﬀects of private




Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) Suppose that  ≥ . Using Lemma 1, it is straightforward to see that the max-
imum expected payoﬀ that the principal can attain in case of traditional procurement
is  ( ) = −1−2+(−[])+(1−)max{− 0}−(1−)(2−1)−
if she implements high eﬀort ( = 1), and it is  = −1−2+max{− 0} oth-
erwise. A comparison of these expected payoﬀs immediately shows that the principal
prefers to implement high eﬀort whenever  ≤  ( ).
(ii) Suppose that   . Then the maximum expected payoﬀ that the principal
can attain given traditional procurement is  ( ) = −1−2+(−)−(1−
)(2−1)− if she implements high eﬀort ( = 1), and it is  = −1−2
otherwise. Comparing the expected payoﬀs shows that the principal implements high
eﬀort whenever  ≤ ˜ ( ). ¥
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Suppose that  ≤ [( − ) − ]. The discussion preceding Proposition 2
shows that then the agent will choose  = 1. Note that in this case the maximum
expected payoﬀ that the principal can attain given a public-private partnership is
 ( ) = −1−2+[−+((−)−)]+(1−)max{− 0}−.
(ii) Suppose that   [(− )− ]. Then the maximum expected payoﬀ that
the principal can attain in case of a public-private partnership is  (  ) = −
1−2+[−+((−)−)]+(1−)max{− 0}−(1−)(−[(−)−
])(2−1)− if she implements  = 1, and it is  = −1−2+max{− 0}
otherwise. A comparison of the expected payoﬀs shows that the principal prefers to
implement  = 1 whenever  ≤  (  ). ¥
Proof or Proposition 3.
(i) Suppose that  ≤ [(−)−]. Then according to Proposition 2 the agent
always exerts high eﬀort ( = 1) in case of a public-private partnership. We know
from Proposition 1 that under traditional procurement, the principal implements
 = 1 whenever the condition  ≤  ( ) is satisfied. The principal’s expected
payoﬀ  ( ) in case of a public-private partnership is always larger than her
expected payoﬀ  under traditional procurement with low eﬀort. Moreover, the
principal’s expected payoﬀ  ( ) in case of a public-private partnership is larger
than her expected payoﬀ  ( ) under traditional procurement with high eﬀort
whenever  ≥ ¯(  ). Note hat ¯(  ) ≤  ( ) must hold, because other-
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wise there would exist eﬀort costs larger than  ( ) (implying    ( ))
and smaller than ¯(  ) (implying  ( )   ( )), which would con-
tradict  ≤  ( ). Hence, the principal prefers a public-private partnership
if   ¯(  ), whereas she prefers traditional procurement if   ¯(  ).
(ii) Suppose that   [( − ) − ]. Under traditional procurement, the
principal implements high eﬀort whenever  ≤  (). In case of a public-private
partnership, according to Proposition 2 the principal implements high eﬀort whenever
 ≤  (  ). Note that if low eﬀort is implemented, the principal’s expected
payoﬀ is  =  =  − 1 − 2 + max{ −  0}, regardless of the mode
of provision. If high eﬀort is implemented under both modes, then the principal’s
expected payoﬀ is  (  ) in case of a public-private partnership, whereas it is
 ( ) under traditional procurement, so that the principal’s expected payoﬀ is
larger in case of a public-private partnership when   ¯( ).
Note that  ( ) and  ( ) are increasing in  and  (12 ) = 0 
 (12  ). Moreover, the unique level of  where  ( ) =  ( )
holds is given by  = ¯( ). Hence,  (  ) ≥  () if  ≤ ¯( ),
and  ( )   ( ) otherwise. Thus, the principal prefers a public-
private partnership if   ¯( ) and    (  ), she prefers traditional
procurement if   ¯( ) and    (), and she is indiﬀerent between the
modes of provision otherwise. ¥
Proof of Lemma 5.
If  ≤ , it is easy to see that it is always optimal for the principal to oﬀer
contract A, so that the agent never gets an information rent and hence he has no
incentive to gather costly information.
Now consider the case   . Suppose that the agent always gathers information
( = 1). If   ˆ(), then according to Lemma 3 the principal would oﬀer contract
A which leaves no rent to the agent. But this means that the agent would have no
incentive to gather costly information, which contradicts  = 1. If  ≥ ˆ(), then the
principal would oﬀer contract A, which the agent would always accept regardless
of the state of nature. Hence, the agent would have no incentive to gather costly
information, again contradicting  = 1. Now suppose that the agent never gathers
information ( = 0). Then the principal would oﬀer the contract A[], so that the
agent would not get a rent without information gathering. Yet, given the oﬀer A[],
if the agent gathers information (and subsequently accepts the oﬀer in the good state
of nature only), his expected information rent is ([] − ) = (1 − )( − ).
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Hence,  must be strictly positive whenever   (1− )( − ). ¥
Proof of Lemma 6.
Suppose the agent has gathered information with probability . At date 3, the
principal’s expected payoﬀ is  − 2 + ( − ) when she oﬀers contract A, it is
 −2 + − +(− ) when she oﬀers A, and it is −2+ (−[]) +
(1− )(−[]) + ([]− ) when she oﬀers A[].
(i) If     ˆ(), then the principal prefers contract A over contract A. Yet,
in equilibrium the principal cannot always oﬀer contract A, because then the agent
would never gather information which contradicts Lemma 5. Moreover, in equilibrium
the principal cannot always oﬀer contract A[], because then the agent would always
gather information, which would also contradict Lemma 5. Hence, the principal must
be indiﬀerent between the contractsA andA[], which is the case if the agent gathers
information with probability  = −−[]−(−[]) . Now suppose the principal oﬀers
contract A[] with probability  and contract A with probability 1 − . Then at
date 2.5, the agent’s expected payoﬀ if he gathers information is ([] − ) − ,
and it is zero otherwise. Thus, the agent is indiﬀerent between gathering and not
gathering information if  = ([]−) .
(ii) If  ≥ ˆ(), then the principal prefers contract A over contract A. In
analogy to part (i), in equilibrium the principal must be indiﬀerent between the
contracts A and A[], which is the case if  = (1−)(−[])(1−)(−[])−([]−) . Suppose the
principal oﬀers contract A[] with probability  and contract A with probability
1 − . Then at date 2.5, the agent’s expected payoﬀ if he gathers information is
([]− )+ (1−)(− )− , and it is (1−)(− ) otherwise. The agent
is indiﬀerent between gathering and not gathering information if  = ([]−) . ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) Consider a public-private partnership. As the agent gets no information rent in
the second stage, he exerts high eﬀort in the first stage whenever − ≥ (1−),
so that the principal sets  = (2 − 1) when she wants to implement high eﬀort.
The maximum expected payoﬀ that the principal can attain is −1−2+(−
) + (1− )max{−  0}− (1− )(2 − 1)−  if she implements high eﬀort
( = 1), and it is  − 1 − 2 + max{ −  0} otherwise. A comparison of these
expected payoﬀs immediately shows that the principal prefers to implement high
eﬀort whenever  ≤ ((− )−max{−  0})(2 − 1)( − (1− )). Note that
this threshold level is smaller than  ( ). Hence, if  is larger than  ( ),
then the principal always implements low eﬀort, so that she is indiﬀerent between
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the two modes of provision. If  is smaller than  ( ), then the principal prefers
traditional procurement, because in case of an innovation her continuation payoﬀ is
larger under traditional procurement (−[]) than given a public-private partnership
((− )).
(ii) Consider a public-private partnership. The agent’s expected information rent
in case of an innovation is ( − )− 1− , so that he exerts high eﬀort in the first
stage whenever
 + [( − )− 
1−  ]−  ≥ (1− )
is satisfied. Thus, the agent exerts high eﬀort in the absence of a direct reward
whenever  ≤ [( − ) − (1 − )]. It straightforward to see that then the
maximum expected payoﬀ that the principal can attain is  ( (1 − )). If
  [( − ) − (1− )], the principal has to pay a direct reward if she wants
to implement high eﬀort. Then the maximum expected payoﬀ that the principal can
attain is  (  (1 − )) if she implements  = 1, and it is  otherwise.
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